Apologies, but Socrates is Guilty (Just)

Introduction

Socrates is a philosopher in ancient Athens. He is put on trial for not believing in the gods of Athens, for creating his own god, and for corrupting the young with his speeches in this regard. He is found guilty and is put to death. This essay examines whether or not Socrates is, in fact, guilty. The conclusion of this essay is that Socrates is guilty, that he makes no serious attempt to defend himself because he knows he is guilty, and that, instead, he uses the occasion of his trial to present Athens with one final exotic declaration of his lifelong philosophic adherence to and advocacy of truth and justice.

Arguments

Does this essay give the best possible advantage to any argument that Socrates was innocent of the charges? Yes. It is based solely on Socrates’ defense, as set out in Plato’s Apology (Source after Conclusion). In other words, this essay takes the very best arguments that can be advanced in favor of finding Socrates innocent, and yet still it determines that Socrates was guilty.

This essay does not incorporate Plato’s Euthyphro or Crito into its arguments. With good reason. Those texts eloquently demonstrate Socrates’ adherence to his advocacy for what it is truthful and just. But they have nothing to do with a trial, which is concerned only with the law (and law set in the context of ancient Athens, not modern America). The mistake made by many commenting on Socrates’ trial is that they confuse this process of law with a philosophy debate. Socrates refers to several conversations with named Athenians as part of his alleged defense. But he never refers to Euthyphro or Crito in such regard. And neither does this essay.

Is Socrates aware of the charges being brought against him? Yes. He says that the sworn statement of his accusers “asserts that Socrates does injustice by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonian that are novel” (24 c).

Is Socrates aware of his responsibilities? Yes. He declares that “the law must be obeyed and a defense speech made” (19 a). Does Socrates believe he is up to the task? Arguable. He says he is “not a clever speaker at all” (17 b). But his defense, as recorded by Plato, belies that claim.

Is Socrates guilty of not believing in the Athenian gods? Since this essay relies primarily on Socrates’ own defense, the question (as with all three charges) really is: does Socrates admit his own guilt, directly or indirectly?

Socrates never actually says he does not believe in the Athenian gods. Socrates establishes that he clearly believes “in gods, since I do in fact believe in daimons” (27 d). But even in the heat of trial and sentencing, facing near certain death, he never states that the gods he believes in are the established Athenian gods. Which would be the simplest way to demonstrate his innocence of this charge. Such assiduous sidestepping strongly suggests knowledge of his own guilt.

There is a secondary issue. Socrates persists in referencing a single god. For example, he talks of his “devotion to the god” (23 c). The question arises, is this an Athenian god, or one of Socrates’ own creation? And does this amount to an admission by Socrates of the second charge, creating his own god?

Socrates readily admits talking to his own daimon, “something divine and daimonic comes to me, a voice” (31 d). Either deliberately, or by accident, Socrates then makes connection between his daimon, dreams and divinity and the single god: “I have been ordered to practice this by the god, as I affirm, from divinations, and from dreams” (33 c). After Socrates is sentenced to death, he directly links “the sign of the god” with his “customary divination from the daimonion” (40 a). Whatever else may be arguable, with his own words, Socrates confirms his guilt on the charge of creating his own god.

The charge of corrupting the young is more arguable. Yet, Socrates trips himself up with what might otherwise be his best defense argument. Why, he asks, has Meletus (Socrates’ primary accuser) not produced anyone who will bear witness to Socrates’ corrupting of the young (34 a)? Socrates provides his own answer, “they [the young] enjoy hearing men examined who suppose they are wise, but are not. For it is not unpleasant” (33c). And so “the corrupted ones themselves would perhaps have a reason to come to my aid,” rather than aid Meletus (34 b).

But should not the relatives of the corrupted young inform on them? Socrates suggests that the relatives do not come forward as witnesses because “they are conscious that Meletus speaks falsely, while I am being truthful?” (34 b). This could be an excellent point underpinning Socrates’ primary line of defense, and his lifelong goal, namely adherence to and advocacy of truth, if he were to call either the young or their relatives as witnesses on his behalf. However, the fact that Socrates does not speaks to his likely knowledge of his own guilt, especially for one who is otherwise so pedantic and careful.

Probably the strongest circumstantial argument attesting to Socrates’ overall guilt is his explanation for advocating his truth in private rather than in public, “if someone who really fights for the just is going to preserve himself even for a short time, it is necessary for him to lead a private rather than a public life” (32 a). Socrates goes to great lengths to ‘preserve himself’ from the Athenian power structure before his trial by keeping his advocacy private. The simplest explanation for this is that he knows he is breaking the law. This is very likely also why Socrates offers no serious defense, but rather seeks to taunt his audience with a series of rhetorical devices: namely, the fact that he knows he is guilty of breaking the law – and because he possesses an abundance of hubris.

Of course, Socrates does not describe his attitude in terms of hubris. Rather, he wraps it up in more palatable language, saying, “I, men of Athens, salute you and love you, but I will obey the god rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able to, I will certainly not stop philosophizing” (29 d). In other words, Socrates is never going to obey the law; he is going only to obey his truth – regardless of whether it breaks the law or not.

However, Socrates slips and makes clear it is about arrogance: “So I, men of Athens, am now far from making a defense speech on my own behalf, as someone might suppose. I do it rather on your behalf, so that you do not do something wrong concerning the gift of the god to you by voting to condemn me. For if you kill me, you will not easily discover another of my sort” (30 e).

With this statement, and others in the same vein, Socrates betrays his so-called defense as so much arrogant and reckless posturing, the aim of which is less to prove his innocence (since he knows he is guilty), and more to indulge in one last brazen unwavering opportunity publicly to taunt those who are threatened by him with the truth: “And yet I know rather well that I incur hatred by these very things; which is also a proof that I speak the truth” (24 a).

Conclusion

Socrates admits he is guilty of the charge of creating his own god. While his defense leaves the charges of not believing in the Athenian gods and of corrupting the young open to debate, it is noticeable that, notwithstanding Socrates’ own recognition of the gravity of his situation, he never declares his innocence and does not call witnesses, both of which work against Socrates. By his own admission, it becomes clear that the reason Socrates is so deficient in his defense, the reason that he sidesteps so assiduously, is that he knows he is guilty, and uses the occasion of his trial as an exotic unwavering farewell taunt of the Athenian power structure.

Source

Plato & Aristophanes. Four Texts On Socrates. Trans. Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998